Categoría: Models of Sentience
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On theories of sentience: a talk with Magnus Vinding
Magnus Vinding is a philosopher focused on reducing suffering. In his works, he has covered topics such as effective altruism, anti-speciesism, suffering-focused ethics (about which he was writing a book at the time of this interview), and issues of personal identity and ontology, such as open individualism and physicalism. He has a degree in mathematics…
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Philosopher Philip Goff answers questions about panpsychism
«—we need both the science and the philosophy to get a theory of consciousness. The science gives us correlations between brain activity and experience. We then have to work out the best philosophical theory that explains those correlations. In my view, the only theory that holds up to scrutiny is panpsychism. When I studied philosophy,…
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How does the world view of a believer in physicalism differ from one of idealism?
Physicalism is the view that no “element of reality” (Einstein) is missing from the mathematical equations of physics – more strictly, tomorrow’s physics beyond the Standard Model plus GR. Idealism is the view that reality is experiential. Most physicalists aren’t idealists, and most idealists aren’t physicalists, but a small minority of researchers are both idealists and physicalists.…
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Is the Orthogonality Thesis Defensible if We Assume Both Valence Realism and Open Individualism?
«I suppose it’s contingent on whether or not digital zombies are capable of general intelligence, which is an open question. However, phenomenally bound subjective world simulations seem like an uncharacteristic extravagance on the part of evolution if non-sphexish p-zombie general intelligence is possible. Of course, it may be possible, but just not reachable through Darwinian…
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Collective intelligence, ants and the binding problem
A single neuron in the human brain can respond only to what the neurons connected to it are doing, but all of them together can be Immanuel Kant. Read more The idea of a collective consciousness (Or Anthill) is pretty simple: instead of cells you have small sentient animal that make up a larger creature.…
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God or consciousness?
A quote from Max Planck: “All matter originates and exists only by virtue of a force which brings the particle of an atom to vibration and holds this most minute solar system of the atom together. We must assume behind this force the existence of a conscious and intelligent mind. This mind is the matrix…
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The science of consciousness and the science of suffering
Most of us are primarily interested in the problem of suffering, and secondarily in the question of consciousness. Because suffering is a phenomenal phenomenon we need to know what is consciousness. This seems to be important in how we approach the question of consciousness here. Currently, the science of consciousness and the science of suffering…
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Monism, dualism, trialism, quadrialism and beyond
«Monistic theories (monism) defend a single type of substance that composes reality (for example, matter -materialism-. Others instead claim that the spirit or psyche -panpsychism-). Dualistic theories (dualism) defend two types of substances (for example, body and mind) or two worlds (earth and sky). Trialist theories (trialism) defend the existence of three types of substances…
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The metaphysics of the end of suffering
Things do not fall down, but are attracted to the center of planet Earth, this being a model that can be complicated including other celestial bodies. The difference is not important at the local level, but it is fundamental to understand it if our plan includes escaping from the planet. In the same way, knowing…
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Consciousness and the binding-problem
While panpsychism sounds crazy, it is actually a highly viable theory of consciousness, as long as it is distinguished from animism: the view that everything is alive and therefore possesses agency, intentionality, thoughts, emotions, etc. Elementary particles almost certainly are not endowed any of these attributes, but according to (my take on) panpsychism, they have…